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3JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to U.C.A. §78-2a-
3(2)(j)(2001)(pour-over civil jurisdiction).
ISSUES ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment, by finding that the UM/UIM
waiver signed by Miriam Salazar complied with U.C.A. 31A-22-305, requiring a statutory
disclosure of UM/UIM benefits and costs. The standard of review is de novo. Gen. Sec.
Indem. Co. of Arizona v. Tipton, 158 P.3d 1121; 2007 UT 127.
2. Whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings
as to the common-law negligence claim of Lopez? The standard of review for summary
judgment is de novo. Harris v. Albrecht, 86 P.3d 728; 2004 UT 13. Because the trial court
also struck the affidavit of the insured, Miriam Salazar, it appears that the question on appeal
is actually whether, construing the complaint in the light most favorable to Salazar, and
indulging all reasonable inferences that might favor her, is there  “any state of facts that could
be proved in support of [her] claims?”. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass’n v. Allied Prop. & Cas. Ins.
Co., 890 P.2d 1029, 1030 (Utah 1995); Helf v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 2009 UT 11.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
The determinative statute is:
U.C.A. §31A-22-305.3(2)(b)(2006):
(i) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of underinsured
4motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, unless the insured
purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an acknowledgment form provided
by the insurer that:
     (i) waives the higher coverage;
     (ii) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; and
     (iii) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured motorist
coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle
liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available
by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1. Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from a summary judgment by the Third District Court, J. Terry
Chrisitansen, in favor of Defendants/Appellees UAIC and El Sol Insurance Company, dismissing
Plaintiff/Appellant Lopez’s claims for underinsured motorist coverage for personal injuries.
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below
Lopez sued UAIC and El Sol, alleging that UAIC used a UIM disclosure and waiver form
that did not comply with Utah law, and for negligence in selling a policy without adequately
explaining the coverages available, to compensate her for injuries she received in an automobile
accident. UAIC and Lopez moved for motion for summary judgment based upon two grounds: 1)
Lopez lacked “standing” to sue for either the adequacy of the statutory disclosure and waiver for
UIM, or negligence in providing requested automobile insurance, and 2) that the disclosure and
waiver form used complied with Utah statute. The trial court granted summary judgment as to both
the first ground, and the second ground. This appeal followed.
1The trial court struck the affidavits of Salazar and Lopez. Presumably, as to the contract
claims based upon the statute, this was based upon some notion of the parol evidence rule, but
there was no explanation why the affidavits should be stricken as to the negligence claims.
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3. Statement of Relevant Facts on Appeal
On February 1, 2007, Miriam Salazar (Salazar), purchased a policy of automobile insurance
from El Sol Insurance Agency. (Stipulation, R. 36-38, p. UAIC 00001-00028). Salazar signed an
application for insurance, which included a paragraph titled “AGREEMENT DELETING
UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST BODILY INJURY COVERAGE”. (Id., UAIC
00030, attached as Appendix 1). One week later, on February 8, 2007, Salazar was driving the car
with Lopez as her passenger, when she was rear-ended by Able Martinez. (R. 43, at ¶1-2). Martinez
was insured by Progressive Insurance which tendered its limits of $25,000.00 to Lopez for her
injuries. (Id., at ¶3-4). Lopez then demanded underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits from UAIC, in
the amount of $25,000.00. (Complaint, R. 5, ¶23). UAIC refused to pay any UIM benefits, (id., R.
6, at ¶24), and Lopez brought this action for herself and all others similarly situated. (Complaint, R.
1-12).
Salazar filed an affidavit1 that averred that she was originally from Guatemala, (R. 53, ¶2),
and only completed the 6th grade there. (Id., at ¶3). She has worked as a packager at Overstock, and
previously worked packing vitamins and making furniture. (Id., at ¶4). She can understand “a little
bit of English, but cannot read anything in English”. (Id., at ¶6). She had never owned a car before,
and had never purchased automobile insurance before, in her life. (Id., at ¶7-11). When she went to
El Sol to buy automobile insurance, she “asked for ‘full coverage’”. (Id., at ¶12). The El Sol agent
6specifically told her that she “would have ‘full coverage’ for me [Salazar] and any other persons in
my [Salazar’s] car.” (Id., at ¶13). She was given a paper to sign, with no other explanation of her
insurance. (Id., at ¶14). She was given no price quote for either UM coverage (which she did select)
or UIM coverage (which she rejected). (Id., at ¶15-16). If El Sol had explained to her what UIM
coverage was, Salazar averred that she would have selected it. (Id., at ¶17). Salazar cannot read any
portion of the “AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORIST
BODILY INJURY COVERAGE”, which UAIC relies upon. (Id., at ¶18).
Lopez averred that she was from Mexico, and completed the 8th grade there. (Id., at ¶2-3).
She can only understand “a little bit of English but cannot read anything in English”. (Id., at ¶4). Like
Salazar, she has never purchased automobile insurance in her life, and does not drive. (Id., at ¶5-6).
Like Salazar, she has to rely upon others to explain her insurance coverage to her. (Id., at ¶8).
Pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56(f), Lopez’ counsel averred that El Sol is an insurance agency
located in West Jordan, Utah, which specifically targets the Spanish-speaking community in Utah.
(Bertch Affidavit, R. 61-66, at ¶22).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The UAIC agreement rejecting UIM coverage did not meet the requirements of U.C.A. §31A-
22-305.3(2)(b))(2006). It did not purport to explain the underinsured motorist benefits that Salazar
could have purchased, nor did it disclose the premium costs. In fact, it lumped uninsured motorist
and underinsured motorist benefits into a single disclosure, despite the fact that these coverages are
separate and distinct. Further, it was negligence for El Sol to fail to explain these coverages in
Spanish, to Salazar, its Spanish-speaking customer. Salazar averred that she would have purchased
7the additional underinsured motorist coverage if she had known about it. Finally, Lopez has standing
to assert that UAIC did not comply with the statute, because she is one of the statutory insureds for
underinsured motorist coverage. Further, she is a foreseeable plaintiff, because the statute
specifically contemplates that underinsured motorist coverage would be extended to passengers of
the named insured. Judgment should not have been granted.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THERE IS NO “LAWFUL WAIVER FORM”
FOR UNDERINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
UAIC and El Sol allege that Salazar “made a valid rejection of underinsured motorist
coverage.” This is not true. U.C.A. §31A-22-305.3(2)(b)(2006) requires:
(b) For new policies written on or after January 1, 2001, the limits of underinsured
motorist coverage shall be equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor
vehicle liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits
available by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy, unless the insured
purchases coverage in a lesser amount by signing an acknowledgment form that:
     (i) is filed with the department;
     (ii) is provided by the insurer;
     (iii) waives the higher coverage;
     (iv) reasonably explains the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage; and
      (v) discloses the additional premiums required to purchase underinsured motorist
coverage with limits equal to the lesser of the limits of the insured's motor vehicle
liability coverage or the maximum underinsured motorist coverage limits available
by the insurer under the insured's motor vehicle policy. 
The UAIC form fails these requirements on TWO grounds:
1. The UAIC form fails to “reasonably explain[] the purpose of underinsured motorist
coverage.
The UAIC form does not contain ANY meaningful explanation or definition of underinsured
8motorist coverage. It merely states: “Uninsured/Underinsured Motorists Bodily Injury Coverage
provides payment for certain benefits for damages caused by the owner or operator of
uninsured/underinsured motor vehicles because of bodily injury, sickness, disease or death.” What
is missing from the waiver:
1) Any definition of “Uninsured” or “Underinsured”. These terms have technical definitions in
the Insurance Code, and the insurer has an obligation to explain them in layman’s terms.
2) Any explanation of what benefits are provided by these coverages. The waiver simply states
“certain benefits”, but unless a customer is already familiar with the Insurance Code, there
is no explanation of what those “certain benefits” might be.
The waiver basically provides nothing at all, by way of information to the insurance
consumer. The waiver provides no “reasonable explanation of the purpose of underinsured motorist
coverage” as required by U.C.A. §31A-22-305.3(2)(b)(2006). It fails to state any purpose whatever
for the coverage, but merely makes a tautological reference to “Uninsured/underinsured Motorist
Coverage”. The waiver is the equivalent of no waiver at all.
2. The UAIC Form Does Not Disclose the Additional Premiums to Purchase UIM
Coverage.
The UAIC form contains no information about the amount of “additional premiums required
to purchase underinsured motorist coverage” as required by U.C.A. §31A-22-305.3(2)(b)(2006).
Without that information, no insurance consumer can make an intelligent decision about whether to
purchase underinsured motorist coverage. At least two premium quotes need to be made: UIM in the
amount of the bodily injury limits, or in the maximum amount that the insured could purchase. The
9UAIC waiver does not contain either of these specific premium amounts.
U.C.A. §31A-22-305.3(2)(b)(iii)(2006) should be read into (2)(b)(ii) by reference. A
reasonable explanation that allows a consumer to make an informed choice must include some
discussion of the cost of that coverage. Simply outlining the definition and coverages is not enough
without a quote on the price for that coverage. That price quote should track (2)(b)(ii) so that the
informed consumer has a chance to properly evaluate whether the coverage is worth the price. If
(2)(b)(ii) does not include a price discussion, as laid out in (2)(b)(iii), the consumer is left without
any price standard to make a decision by. And if (2)(b)(ii) does not include the price discussion of
(2)(b)(iii), then the court has sanctioned an anomalous situation, where the insurer must quote prices
to someone who has already agreed to buy the coverage, but not give any price information to
someone who has decided to decline the coverage. This reading of the statute places the decision
first, and then the pricing information. This is an absurdity; the apparent purpose of the statute is to
provide price information BEFORE the decision to purchase, not after.
The Utah Court of Appeals, in Gen’l Sec. Indem. Co. of Arizona v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109,
158 P.3d 1121, adopted a common-sense reading of the statute, to require that the consumer “be
presented with the maximum amount of UM coverage available, as well as lesser amounts, and then
be allowed to choose.” Id., at ¶19; 158 P.3d at 1126 . While Tipton involved uninsured motorist
coverage, the statutes are in nearly every respect identical. It should be noted that the Tipton court
relied upon the legislative history of the underinsured motorist coverage statute in interpreting the
uninsured motorist statute, because of the similarities. Because Salazar was never presented with the
maximum underinsured motorist coverage, as well as lesser amounts, with the premiums for each,
2The statute and Tipton both make clear that “verbal” disclosures are not sufficient.
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and allowed to choose, her rejection of underinsured motorist coverage was not valid.
POINT TWO
WHEN THERE IS NO VALID WAIVER,
BY LAW THERE IS UIM COVERAGE
When there is no valid waiver2, the legal effect is that there is coverage in amounts “equal
to the lesser of the limits of the insured’s motor vehicle liability coverage or the maximum
underinsured motorist coverage limits available by the insurer under the insured’s motor vehicle
policy . . .”. U.C.A. 31A-22-305(9)(b)(2004). This provision was authoritatively construed by the
recent case of Gen’l Sec. Indem. Co. of Arizona v. Tipton, 2007 UT App 109 (hereafter,“Tipton”).
While Tipton dealt with the effect of a missing uninsured motorist coverage waiver, the statutes are
virtually identical. Compare U.C.A. 31A-22-305(3)(b)(2004) with 305(9)(b)(2004). Tipton quoted
the legislative history of the statute, id. at ¶11, and emphasized that the statute requires the insurer
to “affirmatively” informing the consumer about the levels of coverage and costs. Further, Tipton
makes clear that this disclosure must be made in writing, before the insurance consumer signs the
waiver, if that is what the consumer wants to do. Id., at ¶12: “ the [statute] was specifically adopted
in order to ‘affirmatively inform[]’ insureds about the costs of various levels of UM coverage before
they decide whether to purchase it and in what amounts.” Tipton makes clear that an insurer must
do both: inform of the insurance consumer of the purpose of underinsured motorist coverage, and
the various levels of coverage and the costs, before the consumer makes a decision. That disclosure
must be made in writing. Id. It was not done here, and so Lopez is entitled to coverage.
3 The Utah Court of Appeals in Asael Farr & Sons Co. v. Truck Ins. Exch., 2008 UT App
315, distinguished Harris v. Albrecht, because “Farr's property and liability insurance had to be
customized to Farr's specific needs, unlike an auto or residential homeowner's policy.” Unlike in
Farr or Albrecht, Lopez is suing over a standard auto insurance policy. Id., at ¶31.
11
Tipton discussed the remedy for failure to follow the statute. The insurance consumer is
entitled to the “maximum amount [Salazar/Lopez] could have purchased had [UAIC] provided her
with the required statutory disclosures . . .”. Id., at ¶22. There is no evidence that Salazar could not
have purchased underinsured motorist coverage in the same amount as she purchased uninsured
motorist coverage, or, $25,000. So, $25,000 can be presumed to be the “maximum amount
[Salazar/Lopez] could have purchased. The bodily injury liability limits are admitted to be $25,000
also. So either way, Lopez is entitled to $25,000 coverage for underinsured motorist benefits..
POINT THREE
THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIM SHOULD NOT BE DISMISSED
UAIC argues that there is no legal duty on the part of either the agent, El Sol, or the insurer,
UAIC, to provide a reasonable explanation to a prospective customer. This is contrary to Utah law.
For example, in Salt Lake City School Dist. v. Galbraith & Green, Inc., 740 P.2d 284 (Utah 1987),
an insurance consultant was found liable in damages for negligently failing to advise his client about
insurance coverages. Compare Harris v. Albrecht, 86 P.3d 728 (Utah 2004)(no liability for insurance
agent where no duty to provide insurance was assumed); Lewis v. Pike, 663 P.2d 91 (Utah 1983)(no
duty on part of agent to provide credit life insurance). 
In Harris v. Albrecht3, the Utah Supreme Court looked at the case of Alford v. Tudor Hall
and Assocs., Inc., 75 N.C.App. 279, 330 S.E.2d 830, 832--33 (1985), to define when a claim for
12
negligence for failure to procure insurance would lie. In contrast to Albrecht, El Sol clearly assumed
a duty to provide insurance requested by Salazar. Salazar filled out an application, satisfying the first
Alford factor. El Sol went beyond a “bare acknowledgment against casualty of a specific kind”, the
second Alford factor. El Sol actually issued a policy for automobile insurance, that should have at
least included the statutorily required coverages, or adequately explained those that were declined.
A jury could find that El Sol did “lull [Salazar] into believing that [it] would procure insurance or
that a policy had been procured”, because it did in fact procure a policy. This satisfies the third
Alford factor. The final Alford factor, to “have a pattern of prior dealings of the type sufficient to
impose a duty to procure insurance”, in essentially covered by the fact that El Sol did, in fact,
procure insurance. Salazar’s dealings with El Sol went far beyond the vague assurance that it would
“come out and look at [her] business”, which was all that Harris alleged against Albrecht. Given that
El Sol actually procured insurance, Salazar’s claims against El Sol really go to their failure to fulfill
that assumed duty. A jury could find that a failure to clearly and completely explain UIM coverage
to Salazar, in Spanish, violates a duty El Sol assumed toward its Spanish-speaking customer.
Other courts have specifically held that an insurance agent has a duty to fairly and fully
explain statutorily required coverages such as uninsured motorist coverage:
We hold that in order for an insured to have an option to increase UM limits not to
exceed the limits of the policy, or for the insured to completely reject UM coverage
in writing, an insurance agent has a duty to explain UM coverage as outlined above.
An agent is not necessarily under a duty to recommend that the insured exercise the
option of obtaining UM coverage up to the limits of the policy; however, before an
insured may make an intelligent decision about how much UM coverage he wants,
or make a knowing waiver of UM coverage in writing (which the agent must obtain
if there is to be no UM coverage under the policy), he must understand what he is
entitled to. If an agent fails to uphold this duty to explain, and is thereby found to be
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negligent, damages should not be awarded in an amount less than the statutory
minimum for UM coverage, $10,000.00, nor in an amount more that the limits of the
particular policy in question---i.e., no more than the insured could have opted for
under the terms of the policy.
Aetna Cas. & Surety Co. v. Berry, 669 So.2d 56 (Miss. 1996); Caddy v. Smith, 129 Or App 62 (Or
1994)(“When an insurance agent agrees to procure insurance for an insured, the agent undertakes
a duty to explain the extent to which the insurance procured actually provides the coverage that was
requested”); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Parfrey, 830 P.2d 905 (Colo. 1992)(agent liable for failure to offer
statutory UIM coverage in amount exceeding minimum limits; insured had private cause of action
to enforce statute against agent); Dimeo v. Burns, Brooks & McNeil, Inc., 6 Conn. App. 241, 504
A.2d 557 (1986)(court instructed jury that insurance agent had duty to explain uninsured motorist
coverage); Featherston v. Allstate Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 937 (Id. 1994)(insurance agent has common-
law duty to explain what coverage insured is purchasing; liability for failure to advise regarding
underinsured motorist coverage); Johnson v. Urie, 405 N.W. 2d 887 (Minn. 1987)(complaint against
agent stated claim for negligent failure to advise regarding underinsured motorist coverage); Peter
v. Schumacher Ent., Inc., 22 P.3d 481 (Alaska 2001)(tort claim against agent for failure to advise
of available levels of UIM coverage, as required by statute); Avery v. Arthur E. Armitage Agency,
576 A.2d 907 (N.J. 1990)(insurance agents have duty to offer and explain UM/UIM coverage as
required by statute); Dann v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 Md. App. 41 (1993), cert. denied,
334 Md. 19 (1994) (error in granting summary judgment where insureds disputed that they were
informed of statutory right to obtain UIM coverage in an amount equal to limits of their liability
policy);.  cf. Silver v. Slusher, 770 P.2d 878 (Okla. 1989)(no common-law claim for negligence
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absent a statutory duty to explain uninsured motorist coverage); Pinney v. State Farm Mut. Ins.,  552
S.E.2d 186 (N.C. App. 2001)(no common-law duty to explain UIM coverage to customer who did
not qualify by statute for such coverage); Nelson v. Davidson, 456 N.W. 2d 343 (Wis. 1990)(no
negligence duty to advise regarding UIM coverage where no statutory duty); Trupiano v. Cincinnati
Ins. Co., 654 N.E.2d 886 (In. 1996)(no common-law duty to advise customer to increase UIM limits
absent “special relationship” between agent and customer, applying Michigan law); Show v.
Pemberton, 868 P.2d 164 (Wa. App. 1994)(no common-law duty to advise customer of “hired
vehicle” exclusion to UIM coverage); Robinson v. Charles Flynn Ins. Agency, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 902
(1995)(agent not liable in absence of allegation that he failed to fulfill statutory duty to offer UIM
coverage); Sintros v. Hamon, 810 A.2d 563 (N.H. 2002)(no common-law duty to advise regarding
UIM coverage where no “special relationship” exists); Farmers Ins. Co. v. McCarthy, 871 S.W.2d
(Mo. App. 1994)(same); Mullins v. Comm., 839 S.W.2d 245 (Ky. 1992)(same); Blanchfield v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 511 A.2d 1044 (Del. 1986)(same).
There is a statutory duty on the part of the insurer and agent to provide a “reasonable
explanation” of the purposes of underinsured motorist coverage, and the costs associated with it. The
negligence claim should not have been dismissed.
POINT FOUR
LOPEZ HAS “STANDING” TO PURSUE THESE CLAIMS
The trial court grounded most of its ruling on the fact that Lopez was not the named insured,
but rather, a stranger to the contract, itself. This is contrary to many Utah cases; for instance,  Neel
v. State, 854 P.2d 581, 582 fn. 2 (Utah App. 1993). Neel generally holds that a passenger can sue a
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self-insured owner of a state-owned vehicle for nonpayment of statutory No-Fault (PIP) benefits
without complying with procedural aspects of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. The relevance
to Lopez is that the passenger, who is not in privity of contract with the vehicle owner or its insured,
can still sue to enforce payment of statutorily required automobile insurance benefits. Footnote 2
clearly states the Court of Appeals’ understanding that the passenger would be able to directly sue
the insurer under a third-party beneficiary theory.
There are many other Utah cases involving either passengers or third-party tort claimants who
sued for statutorily required coverages, and were regarded as having standing. Utah law favors
joining all parties, including the plaintiff, tortfeasor, and insurer, in a single action for purposes of
determining insurance obligations. For example, see Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate of
Therkelsen, Jr., 2001 UT 48; 27 P.3d 555 where the insurer brought an action for declaratory relief
against the injured plaintiff and the estate of the tortfeasor, to determine the scope of coverage of a
homeowner’s policy. The landmark case in Utah involving the statutory step-down provision was
a case brought directly by the injured party against the insurer: Cullum v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 857
P.2d 922 (Utah 1993). If there was a fatal problem with the injured party directly suing for
declaratory relief over a step-down provision, surely the Utah Supreme Court in Cullum would have
noted it. Accord: Progressive Cas. Ins. Co. v. Dalgliesh, 52 P.3d 1142; 2002 UT 59 (insurer sued
both driver and injured passenger in action for declaratory relief regarding step-down provision in
auto liability insurance policy); Pollard v. Fire Insurance Exchange, 26 P.3d 868l 2001 UT App 120
(injured party sues insurer of car owner for declaratory relief as to scope of insurance coverage);
Wagner v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 786 P.2d 763 (Utah App. 1990)(wife of deceased passenger
4The trial court acknowledged that “there are situations where a third party beneficiary of
an insurance contract may have standing to sue the insurer, but the situation in the case at bar is
not one of them.” (Memo. Dec. p. 5, fn. 2). The trial court did not explain why.
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brought action for declaratory relief against Farmers to construe step-down provision as applied to
uninsured driver); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Kearl, 896 P.2d 644 (Utah App. 1995)(insurer sued insured
for declaratory relief; all injured parties joined as intervenors); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Geary,
869 P.2d 952 (Utah App. 1994)(insurer sued both insured/tortfeasor and injured plaintiff for
declaratory relief); Viking Ins. Co. of Wisc. v. Coleman, 927 P.2d 661 (Utah App. 1996)(insurer sued
insured and injured parties for declaratory relief).
A contrary rule would create an anomaly, where the Legislature has required insurance
coverage extending to many other persons besides the named insured. If only the named insured can
bring suit to enforce those statutorily required provisions, then no one can. If the named insured sues
for statutory coverage for a passenger, or other insured, the insurer will undoubtedly object that the
named insured has no standing to sue for another person’s injuries. And if the other insured, such
as a passenger, is barred from suing for lack of standing, the statutorily required coverages become
unenforceable. Surely that is not the law.4
CONCLUSION
UAIC used a completely inadequate disclosure and waiver form. It did not comply with the
essentials of the Utah UIM statute, because it did not explain the coverages, or provide premium
information, before the insured made a choice whether to accept or decline UIM coverage. El Sol
owed Salazar a duty to exercise reasonable diligence in its procurement of auto insurance for her.
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At a minimum, this included a duty to explain, in Spanish, the coverages and their costs. This duty
included foreseeable plaintiffs such as Lopez, a passenger who would be covered, pursuant to statute.
And Lopez has standing to assert these claims, because she is the injured party. Salazar lacks
standing because she was not hurt. Otherwise, there is a breach of statute and a tort, but no one with
standing to assert it. Judgment should not have been granted for UAIC and El Sol.
DATED THIS 11th day of June, 2009.
BERTCH ROBSON
Electronically signed /s/ Daniel F. Bertch 
Daniel F. Bertch
Kevin K. Robson
18
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this            day of June, 2009, I served a true and correct copy of the
foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by deposit in first class mail, postage prepaid to the following
counsel of record:
Tim Dalton Dunn
Michael J. Collins
DUNN & DUNN, P.C.
505 East 200 South, Second Floor
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
__________________________________
19
ADDENDUM
A
MEMORANDUM DECISION
September 4, 2008













20
B
AGREEMENT DELETING UNINSURED/UNDERINSURED MOTORISTS
BODILY INJURY COVERAGE

